#060 Clip, art stream. Mantis | Murat Alimov
#060 Clip, art stream. Mantis | Murat Alimov
Спасибо за просмотр!
#060 Clip, art stream. Mantis | Murat Alimov
Спасибо за просмотр!
LNG systems are vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to intrinsic system risks, which include remotely managed third-party systems and vulnerable onboard technologies such as Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), Global Positioning System (GPS), and Automatic Identification System (AIS). These vulnerabilities could lead to overflowing fuel tanks, accidental release of LNG, and other risks that make LNG inaccessible or cause serious impacts when returned to its gaseous state
In mid-February 2022, hackers gained access to computers belonging to current and former employees at nearly two dozen major natural gas suppliers and exporters, including Chevron Corp., Cheniere Energy Inc. and Kinder Morgan Inc. These attacks targeted companies involved with the production of liquefied natural gas (LNG) and were the first stage in an effort to infiltrate an increasingly critical sector of the energy industry.
Additionally, the FBI has warned the energy sector of a likely increase in targeting by Chinese and Russian hackers due to changes in the global energy supply chain. The alert cites factors such as increased US exports of LNG and ongoing Western pressure on Russia’s energy supply but does not mention any specific attacks on LNG tankers.
And now … «We can’t even build our own LNG tankers here in the United States»
In a delightful twist of irony, it turns out that not a single shipyard in the United States is capable of building LNG tankers, as admitted by US Navy Secretary Carlos Del Toro in his testimony before Congress on Wednesday. «We’ve lost this art here in the United States. We can’t even build our own LNG tankers here, in the United States, » Del Toro told the US House Armed Services Committee. According to shipbuilding records, the last time a US shipyard produced an LNG tanker was in 1980.
This revelation is a perfect example of the gamification of consciousness, where people focus on developing certain technologies to a certain level, then become complacent and neglect continuous improvement, research, and development. After all, why bother, since we’ve already achieved what we need? We’ve been trained by computer games, where once something is invented, it doesn’t need to be reinvented. We level up our technology, bask in the glory, and then move on.
But then reality comes knocking, with its annoying habit of not following the rules of a game. Technologies can be forgotten and lost, progress can regress, and skilled workers can disperse and forget their skills. And if there’s a 40-year gap between when a technology was last used and when it’s decided to be revived, the principle of two dead generations comes into play. This principle states that 20-year-old engineers can be taught by 40-year-olds, but not by 60-year-olds. Even if someone who worked on the technology in the 1980s is willing to teach, they may struggle to connect with the younger generation.
Cue the tears and cries of disbelief. «But I played on the computer, and it wasn’t like this! It’s too hard and confusing. Let’s just pretend it’s not true. After all, if the US could build a tanker or fly to the moon once, it must still be able to do so now. I believe it, and it’s comforting and easy to believe it.»